The Western Experience

Israel looks to play game changer in its war with Hamas

January 2, 2009 · 3 Comments

Gaza's central security headquarters and prison, known as the Seraya, after it was hit in an Israeli missile strike in Gaza City on Sunday.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are ramped up in away that has not been seen since 2006 and maybe before that. The IDF’s current military operations against Hamas are offering all the conditions for a much larger picture in terms of military action and a political statement in the region. With well over several hundred air sorties missions flown and that many targets engaged; plus, the IDF has deployed the Mediterranean’s strongest navy off of the Gaza strip in support, which conducted more than 50 attacks on Thursday. Hamas has no defense against a modern military and especially against a country with the will to use it. Lessons were learned against Hizballah during 2006’s bloody and inconclusive stalemate that proved to legitimize the extremist party and strengthen them politically, which led to increased support from Syria and Iran. The Israeli leadership is hoping this conflict leads to a game changer in Gaza and will eliminate Hamas as threat to their security and destroy them politically in Gaza.

Hamas is no doubt trying to model itself after Hizballah by trying to withstand Israel’s best shots, embarrass them internationally, and become heroes at home. Such a scenario would almost certainly further undermine the significance of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) role in Gaza. The gulf of suspicion and competition has widened between the two since Hamas gained control in the summer of 2007. The PA is watching intently at Hamas’ possible doom, or at the least its weakening, so that it can assume control of the land once again. The PA has even publically charged Hamas with igniting the conflict by firing rockets into Israeli towns and Hamas has resented their lack of cooperation and questioned their loyalty to Islam and Arabs. The Israelis know that the divide exist between the two competing forces and sees a chance to rub out a dangerous foe while sending a message to Hizballah and other adversaries in the region that they still have the regions greatest deterrent against lawless attacks and terrorism.

The current campaign against Hamas provides Israel the opportunity to display that message. If Hamas doubted Israel’s response and resolve enough to fire rockets into Israeli towns, and Israel fails to respond with anything less then devastating consequences, it will loose the only deterrent it possesses in a region surrounded by enemies. The only question remains how much force is needed to show that it is able to defend itself adequately, restore its image, and prove military superiority in the region? The images of the IDF limping out of Southern Lebanon are not the images Israeli leaders wish to repeat.

Israel military and government leaders agree that Israel suffered in 2006 because of a lack of a clear exit strategy and war time objectives. They were led further into a war then they initially wanted by Hizballah, stumbling and stopping along the way, instead of applying sound operational objectives and battlefield tactics. Hizballah buried itself amidst the civilian population and made all engagements costly in terms of human losses and political repercussions from the international community. If Hamas continues to fire rockets indiscriminately into populated areas baiting Israel to engage in a ill advised and long, frustrating war, where civilian casualties will be certain, Israel may suffer the same results of 2006 and Hamas can claim victory from the simple terms of surviving and “holding off” the IDF. In other words, another inconclusive engagement will embolden Hamas much in the same way it did Hizballah.

Israel understands this and has several options in which to react to permanently remove Hamas as a force and send a strong message to Hizballah, Syria and Iran. It can continue to pound Hamas strongholds and operating bases from the air, target its leaders and force them into a ceasefire, weakening them politically. Or the IDF can initiate a ground game to remove the rocket sites and destroy their strategic network of tunnels and reoccupy areas in Gaza. However, this scenario will prove risky because of the potential for nasty urban warfare with an enemy who hides among the civilian population and uses human shields as a defense against Israeli attacks.

In a recent incident related to me by the former head of the Israeli air force, Israeli intelligence learned that a family’s house in Gaza was being used to manufacture rockets. The Israeli military gave the residents 30 minutes to leave. Instead, the owner called Hamas, which sent mothers carrying babies to the house.

Hamas knew that Israel would never fire at a home with civilians in it. They also knew that if Israeli authorities did not learn there were civilians in the house and fired on it, Hamas would win a public relations victory by displaying the dead. Israel held its fire. The Hamas rockets that were protected by the human shields were then used against Israeli civilians.

 

 

Nonetheless, tanks and troops have been massed just outside of Gaza that looks to be shaping up for a ground offensive. The army has allowed foreigners living in Gaza to leave on Friday. This sends a strong message that things are about to become messy. There does not seem to be an end in sight and Hamas has continued to fire more rockets into Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert vowed to use an “iron fist” to pummel Hamas, and Premier Haim Ramon has said that Israel should bring Hamas rule of Gaza to an end.

This conflict looks far from over with the promise of escalation and deadly intensity. Israel appears to be determined to remove Hamas from Gaza or at least drastically change the situation there and is willing to gamble militarily and politically in order to do so. And all indications are showing this will not be anything like the Israeli-Hizballah conflict as Israel is planning militarily to move forcefully and deliberately.

Categories: Foreign Affairs
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3 responses so far ↓

  • Mike // January 2, 2009 at 9:21 am

    Jason,

    I think your last sentence sums it up, greatly, Israel learned from the 2006 Lebanon invasion. I do not think they are underestimating Hamas, like they did Hiz.

    Also, with elections a little more than 5 weeks away Olmert doesn’t want to be perceived as weak. He will carry out the invasion forcefully, and I assume, very decisively. The ground game is coming, it’s just a matter of when.

  • Jason // January 2, 2009 at 6:58 pm

    Interesting, I hadn’t thought about the election aspect.

    The Israelis are tired of giving up ground and giving in to international demands only to have that ground occupied by Syrian and Iranian supplied rockets.

    Nope, I think they will do their best to rub out Hamas. The big question is how will the world react if the escalation contributes to civilian deaths. How will the Obama administration monitor the conflict?

    Thanks for dropping by, Mike.

  • Charles S. // January 4, 2009 at 6:36 pm

    Thanks for the run down. I thought it was pretty informative and accurate.

    Nice site too!

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